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Taking and Federal Impairment of Contract Issues
in the Extension of Preemption of Due-on-Sale
Restrictions Beyond Federal Savings and Loans
Prompted by the need to rid their loan portfolios of long-term, low in-
terest rate mortgage loans, savings and loan associations in the early 1970's
began to enforce due-on-sale clauses1 when borrowers assigned their mort-
gages. This new use of the clause,2 which was in response to borrower's
new interest in allowing assumptions,' was challenged by borrowers as a
restraint on alienation. Several states4 accepted the restraint on alienation
argument and adhered to the old use of the clause, allowing lenders to ac-
celerate the loan only when an uncreditworthy individual assumed the mort-
gage. Reacting to these restrictions on enforcement, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, which regulates federal savings and loans, promulgated a
regulation preempting state law in 1976.5 Congress, in 1982, extended this
preemption to all lenders.' A three year grace period was imposed on loans
from lenders other than federal savings and loans in states that had
restricted enforcement of the clause.
Because savings and loans have been unable to make their loan portfolios
fully responsive to shifts in interest rates,7 the thrifts may look to the due-
The following is an example of a due-on-sale clause contained in the FNMA/FHLMC
Uniform Mortgage Instrument:
Transfer of Property: Assumption. If all or any part of the Property or an in-
terest therein is sold or transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior writ-
ten consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to
the Mortgage, (b) the creation of a Purchase Money Security interest for
household appliances, (c) a transfer by devise, descent, or by operation of law
upon the death of a joint tenant or (d) the- grant of any leasehold interest of less
than three years not containing an opinion to purchase, Lender may, at Lender's
option declare all the sums secured by this Mortgage to be immediately due
and payable.
Dunn & Nowinski, Enforcement of Due-On-Transfer Clauses: An Update, 16 REAL PROP.. PROB.
& TR. J. 291 (1981), reprintedin INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM, 1 REAL ESTATE.
PRACTICE INDIANA S VII 24, 34 (1982).
2 Kratovil, A New Dilemma For Thrift Institutions: JudicialEmasculation of the Due-on-
Sale Clause, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 299, 300 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Kratovil].
I Bartke and Tagaropulos, Michigan's Looking Glass World of Due-on-Sale Clauses, 24
WAYNE L. REV. 971, 979-82 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bartke].
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, New Mexico, New York and Utah. S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 22 nn.2-3
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3054,3076 nn.2-3 [hereinafter cited as History].
5 12 C.F.R. SS 545.8-3(f), (g) (1983).
Garn-St.Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1982).
Many of the variable rate mortgages issued during the 1970s contained self-imposed
or regulated restrictions on the amount and frequency of rate increases. Cassidy, Monte Carlo
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on-sale clause of mortgages made before the congressional preemption as
a method of updating their portfolios.
The extension of preemption to lenders other than federal savings and
loans raises several new issues. The effect of the extension of preemption
varies with the status of state law at the time of preemption. The history
of the due-on-sale controversy will be reviewed to identify both the expec-
tations of the parties and the new issues. The issues will be categorized
by the type of lender and the status of state law at the time of preemption.
Common to all affected loans are the issues of whether the mortgage con-
tracts have been impaired8 or whether the property of the mortgagors has
been taken.'
This note examines the impairment and takings issues which are most
clearly present in loans made by lenders other than federal savings and
loans in states that had restricted use of the clause. After describing the
test developed by the Supreme Court in its revival of the contract clause,
this note uses the test to examine the federal impairment of contract issue.
Finally, the extension of preemption is examined under the takings clause.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE DUE-ON-SALE CONTROVERSY
Due-on-sale clauses, which give the lender the right to accelerate the loan
upon transfer of the property, began to be included in mortgage instruments
after the Great Depression to assure lenders that the mortgaged real estate
would be sold only to another creditworthy buyer." Until interest rates
began to rise dramatically in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the sole func-
tion of the clause was to protect the security of the lender.1
Because interest rates were stable during the period following World
War II until 1965,12 neither borrowers nor lenders were concerned with
the question of assumption of the mortgages, so long as the security posi-
tion of the lender was not affected."3 Buyers and sellers preferred refinanc-
ing to assignment because the seller received cash and the buyer was able
to make a smaller down payment. 4 Lenders, therefore, anticipated that the
SimulationEstimates of the Expected Value of the Due-on-Sale Clause inHome Mortgages, Hous-
ING FIN. REV., Jan., 1983, at 34-35.
' Federal impairment of contract is reviewed under the due process clause. U.S. CONST.
amend. V, S 4.
' "Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V, S 5.
'0 Kratovil, supra note 2, at 299-300.
I d.
,2 Bartke, supra note 3, at 974-78.
13 OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV.. AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES 3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; Bartke,
supra note 3, at 977.
" Bartke, supra note 3, at 977 n.17.
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loans would be paid in a period substantially shorter than the length of
the loan.1"
When interest rate stability ended, methods of home financing changed."
New home buyers became interested in assuming lower rate mortgages
because of the differential between rates for new and old mortgages. 7
Homeowners profited from assumption because the new buyers were will-
ing to pay a higher price for the home to be able to assume the below market
rate. 8 Further, the homeowner gained a competitive advantage in the
market by allowing the buyer to assume. 9 By selling on contract, the
homeowner could collect the difference between the mortgage rate of in-
terest and the current market rate.0
Lenders began to put the clauses to the new use of increasing portfolio
yield in response to liquidity problems caused by the increase in interest
rates.2' As interest rates climbed, depositors began to withdraw their money
from the savings and loans to take advantage of the higher rates offered
by other forms of investment.' The withdrawals decreased the available
funds, and savings and loans were unable to make mortgage loans.'
The thrifts fought the loss of deposits by offering higher interest rates
on shorter term savings accounts.24 Because their primary investment was
in twenty-year or longer mortgages which were made when interest rates
were much lower, savings and loans experienced an unprofitable spread
between the interest rates offered depositors and the rate of return on the
old mortgages.' The thrifts, who made the long term loans with the expec-
tation that the loans would be repaid in a period substantiallyshorter than
the term of the loan,' were unable to turn over the mortgage loans fast
enough to keep up with current ratesY Faced with lost depositors and profit
11 ECONoMic ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 7.
11 Id. at 3-9.
17 Id.
Is Id.
19 Bartke, supra note 3, at 981.
Id. at 982.
21 Kratovil, supra note 2, at 300; Bartke, supra note 3, at 979.
2 Kratovil, supra, note 2, at 300. The phenomenon is known as disintermediation.
"Disintermediation is simply that point in time when interest rates, particularly interest rates
on government securities, rise to a point where money flows out of savings institutions [and
into government securities] thereby preventing such institutions from making mortgage loans."
Id. at 300 n.2 (quoting Dall, The Conventional Mortgage-Backed Security, in FNMA-FHLMC
GENERAL COUNSELS' CONFERENCE 159-60 (1978)).
23 Bartke, supra note 3, at 977-79.
2 Note, A Case for Preemption: Wellenkamp v. Bank of America is Inapplicable to Federal
Savings and Loan Associations, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219, 236 (1980).
2 Id.; Bartke, supra note 3, at 978; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 8-9; Dietrich,
Langtieg, Dale-Johnson & Campbell, The Economic Effects of Due-on-Sale Clause Invalidation,
HOUSING FIN. REV., Jan., 1983, at 25-26 [hereinafter cited as Dietrich].
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 7.
2 Note, supra note 24, at 236.
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squeeze and burdened by loan portfolios that they were unable to roll over,
the thrifts began invoking the due-on-sale clause to increase earnings by
forcing refinancing at higher, current mortgage rates. 8
The new use of the clause occurred during a period of consumer suits
against the practices of financial institutions.' Mortgagors, faced with losses
of profits, competitive sales advantage, and the option of selling on con-
tract, challenged the new use as a restraint on alienation, as an usurpation
of an ownership right, and as an unconscionable overreaching by the
lenders. 0
An invalid restraint on alienation is an unreasonable restraint on the abil-
ity to sell property. 1 Borrowers argued that the new use of the due-on-
sale clause was an unreasonable restraint on alienation because it virtual-
ly prevented sales of property with assumed mortgages.2 Courts that ac-
cepted the borrower's reasoning found that the lender's desire to increase
portfolio yield was not the original purpose of the clause and was an insuf-
ficient reason for invoking the clause. These courts placed on the lenders
the burden of proving that their security was impaired by the transfer.'
The usurpation of an ownership right theory also was drawn from
equitable principles. Equity has consistently found that mortgagors retain
all the essential rights of ownership while mortgagees hold only a security
interest in the property. 4 The mortgagor holds the right to devise, convey
or encumber the property, subject only to the lien interest of the
mortgagee. The mortgagee's only right in the property is that the col-
lateral not be impaired.3 6 The mortgagee can not foreclose for any technical
violation of a term in the mortgage agreement if the security is not
jeopardized. When courts allowed the new use, lenders gained a new right:
the option of accelerating when a transfer was made to a creditworthy
buyer.
Appealing to the equitable conscience of the courts, borrowers argued
that the foreclosures caused by acceleration acted as a penalty and a
2' Bartke, supra note 3, at 979; Kratovil, supra note 2, at 300.
Fraser and McMurry, The Bank Board's Preemption Decision: Its Origins and Conse-
quences, 48 LEGAL BULL. 190, 191 (1982).
" See generally id. (which discussed the equitable defenses to acceleration under the new
use); Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 713 (1976).
3' Note, Mortgages - A Catalogue and Critique on the Role of Equity in the Enforcement of
Modern-Day "Due-on-Sale" Clauses, 26 ARK. L. REV. 485, 490 (1973).
u Bartke, supra note 3, at 990; Kratovil, supra note 2, at 300; Note, Judicial Treatment
of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Case for Adopting Standards of Reasonableness and Uncons-
cionability, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1975).
1 Bartke, supra note 3, at 990.




31 See Note, supra note 32, at 1116-17.
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forfeiture which is contrary to equitable precepts. 9 Further, borrowers
argued that the due-on-sale clause was misleading because it does not put
the borrower on notice that the bank has specifically reserved the right
to raise the interest charge to the market rate upon transfer."' The bor-
rowers also argued that the mortgage was an adhesion contract. 1 Because
the borrowers were rarely in a position to bargain with the lenders, who
also were more experienced and sophisticated, the lenders could impose
their terms.
Lenders, under a freedom of contract theory, argued that the clauses
were as presumptively valid as any other contractual agreements between
the parties. 3 They further argued that their security in the property was
enhanced by the continued ownership of the original borrower whom they
knew and had screened." Invoking the clauses was reasonable, therefore,
because it protected the lender's security interest.
Courts responded by assigning the burden of proof to the party whose
argument was disfavored by the court. Courts which were swayed by the
ownership and fairness arguments of the borrowers limited the use of the
clause to protection of the lender's security and placed the burden of prov-
ing an impairment of security on the lender.'" Courts which found the use
reasonable implicity reasoned that there was a rebuttable presumption that
a change in ownership increases the risks of the lender. 7 Other courts forth-
rightly held that the lender's desire to increase the rate of return on its
mortgage portfolio was a sufficient justification for the enforcement of the
clause. 8 Under either of these approaches which favored lenders, enforce-
ment of the clause was subject to the equitable defenses of fraud, duress,
misrepresentation or overreaching by the lender. 9 The borrower had the
burden of affirmatively pleading and proving these defenses.5 0
The controversy was not limited to the courts. Several states passed
statutes limiting the use of the clause to the security purpose and limiting
fees charged on transfer or increases in the interest rate. 1 California re-
, Note, supra note 31, at 491.
, Note, supra note 32, at 1124-25.
41 Id. at 1124.
42 Id.
43 Bartke, supra note 3, at 985-86.
44 Id.
45 Id.
,6 Id. at 992-93.
'7 Id. at 985-86.
40 Id. at 987.
"9 Id. at 988.
w Id.
11 The following states have adopted laws restricting enforcement of due-on-sale clauses:
Colorado, in 1975, COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-165 (1973); Iowa, in 1979, IowA CODE ANN. S 535.8
(West Supp. 1983-1984); New Mexico, in 1979, N.M. STAT ANN. §§ 48-7-11 to -14 (Supp. 1982);
Utah, in 1981, UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-15-1 to -10 (Supp. 1981); and Georgia, in 1979, GA. CODE
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quired the clause to appear both in the note and the mortgage.'2
Responding to the adverse court decisions and statutes, the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, which regulates federally chartered savings and
loans, promulgated a regulation explicitly preempting state law in 1976.'
In the preamble to the regulation, the Board explained its intent that the
due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loans be governed "exclusively
by Federal law." To insure the "[flederal associations shall not be bound
by or subject to any conflicting state law which imposes different... due-
on-sale requirements,"55 the regulation made exercise of the clause a mat-
ter "exclusively governed by the contract .... [with] all rights and remedies
of the association and borrower.., fixed and governed by that contract."'
The focus of the controversy shifted to whether the Board could bring
the question of enforceability within its jurisdiction by characterizing en-
forcement as a lending practice 7 and, if the Board did have authority to
regulate enforcement of the clause, whether it had effectively preempted
state law.' Borrowers argued that the question of whether the clause could
be enforced was a matter of state property and mortgage law and not a
form of regulation over federal savings and loans. 9 Further, if the Board
did have authority to preempt state law, state law was not preempted un-
til 1976 when the Board promulgated the due-on-sale regulation.0 The
Board, however, interpreted a 1948 regulation requiring all loan instruments
to provide for full protection to the federal association as authorizing federal
savings and loans to exercise due-on-sale provisions because such clauses
would help insure full protection to the lender. 1 Preemption, under the
Board's theory, therefore, took place in 1948.
Whether the Board's regulation preempted state law was addressed by
the Supreme Court in Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan v. de la Cuesta,2
which involved three California loans which had been accelerated after the
lender learned of transfer of the secured property. The lender had instituted
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings and the new purchasers filed suit.' Two
ANN. S 44-14-5 (1982). Arizona has limited fees and interest rate increases on the transfer of
trust property. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 33-806.01 (1974).
2 CAL. CIv. CODE S 2924.5 (West 1974).




" Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3023 (1982).
5 Id.
51 See id. at 3020.
' Fraser, supra note 29, at 191-93.
", Id. at 193.
" 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982).
" Id. at 3020. Two of the deeds of trust contained a choice-of-law clause which provided
that the deed "shall be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the property is located."
Id. at 3019. The new purchasers challenged both the Board's intent and authority to preempt
California law. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. at 3014. The intent argument had two grounds. First,
[Vol. 58:651
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of the deeds were executed before either the Board's 1976 regulation or
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America,1 the landmark California case restricting
the use of the clause to cases where the security was impaired. 5
The Court found the Board's authority to preempt in section 5(A) of the
Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA).66
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may
invest their funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes,
the Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may
prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination,
operation, and regulation of associations to be known as "Federal
Savings and Loan Association" ,or "Federal savings banks" ..., and to
issue charters therefor, giving primary consideration to the best prac-
tice of local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the United
States."7
Endorsing a lower court opinion that "[iut would have been difficult for Con-
gress to give the Bank Board a broader mandate,"88 the Court held that
"Congress' explicit delegation of jurisdiction over the 'operation' of these
institutions must empower the Board to issue regulations governing mort-
gage loan instruments, for mortgages are a central part of any savings and
loan's 'operation."',9 By directing the Board, rather than the states, to con-
sider the best practices of local mutual thrift, and home financing
institutions" Congress intended that the Board develop a uniform system
the purchasers argued that the Board had not demonstrated the requisite intent to preempt
because the Board merely authorized rather than compelled savings and loans to exercise
their rights under the clauses. Id. at 3023-24. Characterizing the authorization as granting
an option, the availability of which the Board considered essential to the economic sound-
ness of the thrift industry, the Court found that California law had been preempted because
it "created an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of the due-on-sale regulation:' Id. at 3024.
The purchasers' second argument was based on the second sentence of the regulation. "[E]x-
ercise by the association of such option (hereafter called a due-on-sale clause) shall be ex-
clusively governed by the terms of the loan contract, and all rights and remedies of the associa-
tion and borrower shall be fixed and governed by that contract." Id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. 5
545.8-3(f) (1982)). The purchaser's interpreted this language as incorporating state contract
law, including state law restricting enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. Id.
Noting that the incorporation of state law does not exclude federal law because "the Con-
stitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are as much a part of the law of every State
as its own local laws and Constitution," id., the Court found explicit intent to displace
state law in the preamble of the regulation. Id. at 3024-25.
21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr 379 (1978).
" Two earlier California cases restricting the use of due-on-sale clauses had permitted
unrestricted exercise in cases of outright transfer of security. LaSala v. American Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P2d 1113,97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971) (further encumbrance); Tucker
v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974). See de
la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. at 3031 n.24.
1 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. % 1461-1470 (1982)).
12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982) (emphasis theirs).
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of savings and loans" capable of remaining financially sound." The Court
held that the Board unquestionably had jurisdiction over the associations'
lending practices," had extensively regulated those practices, and specifi-
cally, had regulated the terms of the loan instruments. 4 Because the Court
viewed the due-on-sale regulation as a regulation of mortgage lending
practices,75 it held that the regulation was a reasonable exercise of the
Board's authority to ensure the financial stability of the savings and loans.
Several issues were left open by the de la Cuesta opinion,77 principa~y
the pre-regulation loan problem. The purchasers had argued that the regula-
tion was not applicable to the two deeds executed before 1976 because to
do so would have destroyed vested rights.' The Court, in a footnote, avoided
the issue by noting that California law permitted the unrestricted exer-
cise of due-on-sale clauses when the deeds were executed. 9 Because
Wellenkamp was decided two years after the Board's regulation, it was in-
applicable to federal savings and loans."0 The plaintiffs, therefore, did not
have vested rights.81
Congress responded to the de la Cuesta decision by enacting the Garn-
St.Germain Depository Institutions Act (Act),82 which extended preemp-
", Id. at 3028-29.
72 Id. at 3029-30.
" Id. at 3029.
' Id. at n.20.
"' Id. at 3030.
76 Id.
" The issues include: (1)whether federal associations which reserved the right to accelerate
rather than challenge transfers in court may accelerate; (2)whether a state institution which
converts to a federal charter may accelerate loans made before the conversion; (3)whether
loans originated by a federal savings and loan but since transferred may be accelerated;
(4)whether loans originated by nonfederal association lenders but now held by a federal associa-
tion may be accelerated; (5}whether state statutes giving state chartered institutions the
same rights, powers and privileges of federally chartered institutions override state law
restricting enforcement; (6)whether the Comptroller of the Currency and the National Credit
Union Administration had the authority to preempt restrictive state law. Fraser, supra note
29, at 201-03.
78 de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. at 3031 n.24. The federal thrifts had developed three arguments
against the vested rights theory. First, they argued that the Home Owner's Loan Act itself
preempted state law. Second, relying on a 1948 regulation which requires all loan instruments
to provide for full protection to the federal association, the associations argued that the 1976
regulation merely affirmed prior Bank Board regulatory authorization of use of due-on-sale
clauses. Last, they argued that the vested rights were the product of a legal fiction that state
appellate courts do not change the law when they overrule existing authority but, rather,
simply decide what the law had always been. The associations urged the Court to disregard
the fiction. Fraser, supra note 29, at 199.
"' de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. at 3031 n.24.Id.
SI d.
U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1982). In October of 1981, legislation to preempt state law restricting
use of due-on-sale clause was introduced in both houses of Congress. S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st.
Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 11257 (19811; H.R. 4724, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Both versions
eliminated equitable arguments that a non-security use was a usurpation of an ownership
right, see supra text accompanying notes 31-42, a restraint on alienation, see supra text ac-
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tion beyond federal savings and loans and reflected some concern with
vested rights. Coverage was extended to include any person or govern-
ment agency making a real property loan, or any assignee or transferee
of such a person or a government agency.8
Concern with vested rights prompted Congress to delay preemption for
some loans. The Act provides a three-year grace period for loans that were
made in a state which had restricted use of the clauses, by constitutional
provision, statute or judicial decision having statewide application,' were
companying notes 30-32, or unconscionable overreaching, see supra text accompanying notes
41-42. The rights of the parties were fixed by the contracts. S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.§ 141(f)(1), 128 CONG. REC. 11257 (1981); H.R. 4724, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. S 301(f) (1981). The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board was given authority both to issue rules and regulations in-
terpreting the Act, S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. S 142(g)(1), 128 CONG. REC. 11257 (1981); H.R.
4724, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(g)(1) (1981), and to require lenders to observe consumer
safeguards. S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 11257 (1981); H.R. 4724,97th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 301(f) (1981).
The scope of the preemption differed between the two bills. Under the House version,
preemption was limited to loans originated or held by federally chartered savings and loans,
banks and credit unions. H.R. 4724,97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(f) (1981). The scope of the Senate
version is unclear. Preemption was to apply to loans made by depository institutions or lenders
who participated in the federal mortgage insurance programs. S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 141(fU (1981). An earlier section of the Code, which S. 1720 amended, defined depository
institution as a federally insured lender.
(2)(A)The provisions of the constitution or law of any State expressly limiting
the rate or amount of interest which may be charged, taken, received, or reserved
shall not apply to any deposit or account held by, or other obligation of a
depository institution. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "depository
institution" means -
(i)any insured bank as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813);
(ii)any mutual savings bank as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit In-
surance Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813);
(iii)any savings bank as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813);
(iv)any insured credit union as defined in section 101 of the Federal Credit
Union Act (12 U.S.C. § 1752);
(v)any member as defined in section 2 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act
(12 U.S.C. § 1422); and
(vi)any insured institution as defined in section 408 of the National Housing
Act (12 U.S.C. S 1730a).
Pub. L. No. 96-221, title V, § 501(a)(2)(A) (12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1976)).
Because state chartered institutions commonly are insured by the FDIC or FSLIC, this
provision, along with the inclusion of participants in the insured mortgage program, gave
the Senate version a much broader scope.
The Senate, unlike the House, included an opt-out provision in its bill. S. 1720, 97th Cong.
1st Sess. S 141(f)(2), 128 CONG. REC. 11257 (1981). The states were given three years to over-
ride the preemption by statute or referendum.
Id. S (a)(2). Congress intended coverage to include: "individuals, state and federally
chartered savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, state chartered banks, na-
tional banks, mortgage bankers and other HUD approved lenders, manufactured home retailers
which extend credit, finance companies which make real property loans, agencies of the federal
government.., and transferees ... of any of them." History, supra note 4, at 56-7, U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3110-11.
12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982).
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made by a lender which was not a federally chartered savings and loan,5
and were made during the period after the state had restricted use but
before passage of the Act," (window period loans)."
The states and two federal agencies were given authority to lengthen
or shorten the grace period for window period loans." The authorities may
otherwise regulate the loans, for example, by authorizing an interest rate
between the lower contract rate and the higher market rate.89 If the states
or federal agencies fail to extend the grace period, due-on-sale clauses in
window period loans will become enforceable at the end of the three year
grace period. 0 The three year grace period does not apply to loans made
by federally chartered savings and loans or savings banks,9 or to loans made
in states which had not restricted use of due-on-sale clauses2
The issues remaining after de la Cuesta and passage of the Act are best
articulated by dividing the affected loans into three groups: pre-regulation
loans made by federal savings and loans, loans made by other lenders in
states that had restricted use of the clauses, and loans made by other
lenders in states that had not passed a statute or constitutional provision
on due-on-sale or that did not have a court decision on the question of
whether use of due-on-sale clauses should be restricted. For purposes of
clarity, states that restricted use will be called declared states. States that
had not confronted the issue will be called undeclared states. Pre-regulation
loans made by federal savings and loans will be called pre-regulation loans.
Loans made by lenders other than federal savings and loans will be called
other lender loans.
This categorization reveals four groups of potential plaintiffs: parties with
other lender loans from declared states, parties with other lender loans
from undeclared states, parties with pre-regulation loans from declared
states, and parties with pre-regulation loans from undeclared states.
Although issues of whether contracts have been impaired or property has
been taken are common to all four groups, these issues are most clearly
present in the other lender declared group because the Act extinguishes
rights explicitly guaranteed by the states.
The other three groups face threshold questions concerning whether they
85 Id. S (c)(2)(c).
Id. 1S (c)(1).
7 History, supra note 4, at 22-24, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3076-78.
- 12 U.S.C. S 1701j-3(c)(1)(A), (B) (1982). The states may regulate loans originating from
lenders other than federally chartered institutions. Id. S (c)(1)(A). The Comptroller of the Cur-
rency may regulate loans made by national banks. Id. S (c)(1l(B). And, the National Credit
Union Administration Board may regulate loans made by federal credit unions. Id.
History, supra note 4, at 23, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3077.
12 U.S.C. S 1701j-3(c)(1XA), (B) (1982).




had rights before the Act was passed.93 Resolution of threshold questions
of existence of rights for groups other than the other lender declared
category is beyond the scope of this note. The existence of equitable rights
of ownership and freedom from restraints on alienation or from uncon-
scionable overreaching must be determined by state law. Whether state
law was preempted by HOLA or by the 1945 regulation is a matter of
preemption doctrine.
Consequently, this note examines the impairment and taking issues for
the other lender declared group. Also, occasionally it examines what issues
would arise if one of the other groups were able to establish preexisting
rights.
IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT
Because it attaches new benefits and obligations to the mortgage con-
tracts, the preemption of state due-on-sale law presents a classic problem
of a retroactive statute. 4 Retroactive legislation traditionally has been
regarded as undesirable because it reduces the possibility of planning con-
duct with reasonable certainty of the legal consequences, and creates uncer-
tainty about past transactions. 6 Yet, because the law must change to meet
new fact situations and new social values, prohibitions against retroactive
laws can never be absolute. 7
Constitutional protection against retroactive civil statutes is found in
the contract clause, which provides that "no State shall.., pass any ...
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."98 and in the due process clause
11 Plaintiffs from the other lender undeclared group must establish that they had rights
even though the state had not explicitly restricted the use of the clauses. These plaintiffs
may point to case law supporting the doctrine that mortgagors retain all ownership interests
in their property while mortgagees are limited to security interests and argue that the Act
grants the mortgagee an ownership interest. See supra text accompanying notes 34-38. These
plaintiffs further may argue that the Act extinguishes their equitable rights to be free from
restraints on alienation or unconscionable overreaching. The lenders may argue that the Act
confirms a preexisting but unaffirmed ownership interest. For plaintiffs from the pre-regulation
declared group, see History, supra note 4, at 22 nn.2-5, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3076
nn.2-3 (for a list of states which restricted use before the 1976 regulation), the threshold ques-
tion is when the Board's preemption occurred. If state law was preempted in 1933 by HOLA
or in 1948 by the full protection regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(a) (1983), the Act-did not ex-
tinguish pre-existing rights. Plaintiffs from the pre-regulation undeclared group face the double
burden of proving that the Board did not preempt until 1976 and that their rights existed
though undeclared.
11 A statute is retroactive when it attempts to establish the legal significance of transac-
tions that occurred before its enactment. Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil
Legislation, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 540, 544 (1956).
11 Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73
HARV. L. REV. 692, 692-93 (1960).
96 Id.
9 Id.
" U.S. CONST. art. I., 5 10, cl. 1.
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of the fifth amendment,99 which prohibits the federal government from
depriving any person of property without due process of law.'0 The ten-
sion between reliability and flexibility has been reflected in the analysis
of statutes under both clauses. 0 ' Although the contract clause is phrased
in absolute terms, the states are not prevented from exercising their police
powers by private contracts." Traditionally, the balancing process under
fifth amendment due process has appeared to be the same as that under
the contract clause."' Although the Court's revival of the contract clause
leaves the balancing process unclear, it does not suggest that the Court
should differentiate its review under the two clauses."4 This note, therefore,
will analyze the retrospective aspects of due-on-sale preemption under the
revived contract clause.
The Revived Contract Clause
There are three steps in the analysis of a statute under the revived con-
tract clause."' First, the Court examines the severity of the impairment
" U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provision that property shall not be taken
for a public use without just compensation occasionally has been invoked to invalidate retroac-
tive statutes, but the generally accepted view is that the takings clause only applies to direct
appropriations of private property by the government. Hochman, supra note 95, at 694 n.15.
10 Hochman, supra note 95, at 694.
"' Id. at 694-95.
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697, 704 (1983);
Schwartz, Old Wine in Old Bottles? The Renaissance of the Contract Clause, 1979 SuP. CT. REv.
95, 99-101.
103 Hochman, supra note 95, at 695; Hale, The Supreme Court and The Contract Clause: III,
57 HARv. L. REV. 852,890 (1944; Schwartz, supra note 102, at 121;see Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934) (a contract clause case in support of the proposition that the due process clause doesn't
invalidate economic legislation solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations.); United
States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 n.25 (1977) (noting that the same standard
of review was employed when either a state or the federal government impaired its own
contract.); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359,367 n.12 (comparing federal
impairment of contracts under ERISA to the state impairment in Allied Structural Steel
Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978)).
... Justice Brennan, the principal spokesman against the revival of the contract clause,
argues that the Court has given a unified interpretation to the clauses which protects economic
interests and that the Court, in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), adopted
a deferential standard of review when evaluating a contract impairment under the due proc-
ess clause. By reviving the contract clause, the Court has broken the unified interpretation.
Brennan argues that the Court should restore the unified interpretation by returning to
deferential review. He does not argue that the unified interpretation should be abandoned.
Futhermore, Turner Elkhorn may be reconcilable with the new contract clause review.
Although Brennan characterized the review as deferential, the Turner Elkhorn Court ex-
plicitly noted that "[tihe retrospective aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects,
must meet the test of due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for
the former." 428 U.S. at 17. Moreover, the legislation in Turner Elkhorn, which imposed upon
coal operators an obligation to compensate miners for death or total disability due to black
lung disease, was broadly focused in contrast to the narrow aim of the statute struck in Allied
Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). Turner Elkhorn, therefore, may be recon-
cilable with the contract clause cases.
"' Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697,704-06 (1983).
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caused by the change to determine whether judicial review should be in-
voked and, if it should, what level of scrutiny should be applied., Minimal
alterations of contractual obligations will not trigger review." If the im-
pairment is severe, however, the level of scrutiny will be heightened. 8 Sec-
ond, if the Court finds that the impairment is sufficiently severe to war-
rant judicial review, it examines the justification for the statute to see if
it meets a significant and legitimate public purpose.0 9 The final inquiry is
whether "the adjustment of 'the rights and responsibilities of contracting
parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character ap-
propriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation's] adoption.'"11
The first step, assessing the severity of the impairment, is directly related
to the balance between allowing the parties to rely on their contracts"'
and allowing government to change the law."' Two concerns may be ex-
tracted from the Court's determination of severity: whether the lost benefit
was a gain reasonably expected from the contract (the reasonable gains
test);"' and, whether it was reasonable for the contracting parties to rely
on the continuing existence of the law (the reasonable reliance test).'"
The standard for measuring an impairment under the reasonable gains
test is whether the person asserting the right would have entered into the
original transaction had he been able to foresee the subsequent legislation."'
If the legislation takes from the contract the quality of an acceptable in-
vestment for a rational investor, the party, obviously, would not have
entered into the contract; the legislation would be invalid under the con-
tract clause."' If, however, the impaired benefit was not the central under-
taking of the contract and did not induce the injured party to enter into
the contract, the legislation impairing the benefit is valid."' The test,
therefore, distinguishes between rights central to the contract and
peripheral concerns.
The tension between reliance and flexibility is more directly expressed
in the reasonable reliance test. When a contract is made in an area subject
to the regulatory powers of the legislature, it necessarily is subject to the
further exercise of the legislative powers."' To hold otherwise would allow
the parties to remove their transactions from the control of the legislature
106 Id.
17 Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 246 (1978).
Ics Id.
"9 Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at 705.
Id. (quoting United States Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 14, 22 (1977)).




"I Shelter Framing Corp. v. Carpenter's Pension Trust, 543 F. Supp. 1234, 1249 (C.D. Cal.
1982); Hochman, supra note 95, at 715.
' See W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56,60 (1935); Hochman, supranote 95, at 715.
1 See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515 (1965).
1 Hochman, supra note 95, at 700.
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by making a contract about them. 9 In the broadest reading of this princi-
ple, the reliance interests of the parties are not impaired because, when
the contract was made, the parties were on notice that the legislature had
competence in a given field, and that it may exercise its powers. Conse-
quently, the parties suffer no unfair surprise when these powers are exer-
cised retroactively.1 2 0
If the implied power of the government to regulate further was always
given this broad protection, the contract and due process clauses would
no longer protect reliance interests.21 Under the broad reading, retroac-
tivity would be immaterial in determining the constitutionality of a
statute." If the legislature could act prospectively, it could make the statute
apply to past transactions." The certainty required for planning conduct
through contracts would be destroyed because the legislature might change
the legal effect of past transactions at will.
1 24
As applied, the test of reasonable reliance on the law protects against
drastic and unexpected legislation. If a contract is expressly structured
against a background of regulation, the parties have anticipated regulatory
change and their expectations that there will be no further regulation would
be both unreasonable and too intrusive on the power of the legislature.'25
When a contract does not expressly anticipate regulation, but impliedly
incorporates existing law,1 26 the courts must infer the expectations of the
parties at the time of formation to determine whether the impact of the
regulation is unexpected and drastic.
It is unclear from recent contract clause cases whether a regulation is
unexpected because it regulates a particular subject not previously
regulated or because it enters a general area not previously regulated. Both
Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus27 and Energy Reserves Group v. Kan-
sas Power and Light, 8 the most recent contract clause cases, rely on Veix
"9 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908).
12 Hochman, supra note 95, at 700.
12 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
" Hochman, supra note 95, at 700.
123 Id.
"2 Id. Another article points out that the broad reading would place complete reliance for
the protection of property and contractual rights on the judgment of the legislature and argues
that the Court should be the final arbiter of these rights because the legislature is more likely
to be influenced by political forces and temporary expediencies. Under a process theory of
the contract clause, the Court would limit its review to "whether the legislature made the
judgment necessary to support the validity of the impairment and whether the political pro-
cess functioned effectively to provide all interested parties with a fair opportunity to argue
their cases or to challenge an adverse decision." Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to the
Contract Clause, 89 YALE J.L. 1623,1645 (1980). See generally Michelman, Process andProper-
ty in Constitutional Theory, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 577 (1982); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
2 Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at 707-08.
12 United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 19 n.17.
127 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
2 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983).
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v. Sixth Ward Building and Loan Ass'n"9 for the proposition that an ex-
pectation of no further regulation is unreasonable. In both Veix and Energy
Reserves the particular subject had been previously regulated; in Allied it
had not. It appears clear from Allied that a regulation in a previously
unregulated area would be unexpected, l0 while Veix and Energy Reserves
show that a regulation on a particular subject would be expected if both
the area and the subject had previously been regulated.131 What is not clear
is whether a regulation would be expected if the particular subject had not
been regulated but the area had.
The drastic element of the reasonable reliance test examines whether
the change in the law changes an obligation in an area where reliance is
vital. 13 An impairment is likely to be found to be drastic when the bur-
dened party had relied on the contract terms to assess future liability, and
the change imposed a completely unexpected liability in potentially disa-
bling amounts without provision for gradual applicability."
In summary, the inquiry into severity examines whether the impaired
benefit was central to the contractual undertaking and examines whether
the new regulation operates in a previously unregulated area or imposes
potentially disabling liabilities. The second inquiry, whether the statute
serves a significant and legitimate public purpose, guarantees that the state
uses its power to remedy a broad and general social or economic problem
rather than provide a benefit to special interests.0 A statute may be
suspected of serving special interests if there is no showing of legislative
intent to meet an important general social problem,'35 if the focus of the
legislation is extremely narrow,"' or if the law deals only with private rights
and not a legitimate public end. 1 The degree of deference given the
legislative judgment in the final inquiry, which addresses the
reasonableness and necessity of the legislation, also depends upon whether
the state is a party to the contract. When a state is a party to a contract,
complete deference to the legislature's judgment that the contract should
be impaired is inappropriate because the state's self interest is involved. 38
Although legislation impairing private contracts enjoys a presumption
favoring the legislative judgment of reasonableness and necessity, the
129 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
'1 SeeAllied, 438 U.S. at 234. It is unclear how much weight was given this factor in Allied
because of the drastic nature of the impairment.
131 See Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at 697.
Shelter Framing, 543 F. Supp. at 1251-52.
133 See Allied, 438 U.S. at 247-49.
11 Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at 705.
13 Allied, 438 U.S. at 248-49.
1 Id.; Note, supra note 124, at 1631 n.46.
1 Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1936). But see Hochman, supra
note 95, at 697 n.29 (noting that Treigle may be irreconcilable with Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, 310 US. 32 (1940)).
13 Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at 705 n.14.
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presumption will not stand if the legislature is completely indifferent to
the interests of the adversely affected parties."9 To be reasonable and
necessary, the legislation must have "limitations as to time, amount, cir-
cumstances, or need"" demonstrating an attempt to impose liability only
to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative purpose.' Once this facial
concern for the adversely affected parties has been shown, deference will
be given to the means chosen.14 1
An Analysis of Due-on-Sale Preemption Using the Tests of the
Revived Contract Clause
Although analysis of the retroactive aspects of due-on-sale preemption
under the public purpose and reasonable and necessary tests suggests con-
stitutionality, analysis of whether the impairment was severe is fact specific.
The expansion of preemption to include plaintiffs from the other lender
declared group may make the results of the impact text vary by time of
loan, type of lender, and type of loan. Because of the complexity of the issues,
this note uses residential mortgages as a means for its analysis.'
Analysis of the impact of retroactivity under the reasonable gains test,
the first factor of the impact test, varies by time of loan. For loans made
before use of the clauses was restricted, removal of the restriction reduces
the borrower's gains to those reasonably expected from the contract. Before
the rapid rise in interest rates, due-on-sale clauses were of peripheral con-
cern to both parties. Borrowers expected the purchasers of their homes
I" In all contract clause cases decided after Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398 (1934), and including El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965), the Court considered
the degree to which the legislature sought to protect the interests of the adversely affected
parties and struck legislation when the legislature was indifferent. Note, Revival of the Con-
tract Clause: Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus and United States Trust v. New Jersey,
65 VA. L. REv. 377,399 (1979). The Court did not decide any contract clause cases afterElPaso
until United States Trust. The concern for the adversely affected parties reappeared in United
States Trust and Allied. The United States Trust opinion noted that "the State has made no
effort to compensate the bondholders for any loss sustained by the repeal ... nor was the
covenant merely modified or replaced by an arguably comparable security provision. Its
outright repeal totally eliminated an important security provision .... 431 U.S. at 19. The
Allied opinion stressed the adverse impact the statute would have on Allied while failing
to moderate the impact. "The effect of [the Minnesota statute] on this contractual obligation
was severe .... [T]he statute in question here nullifies express terms of the company's con-
tractual obligations and imposes a completely unexpected liability in potentially disabling
amounts. There is not even any provision for gradual applicability or grace periods." 438
U.S. at 246-47. Federal impairment of contracts in enacting ERISA, was acceptable because
Congress demonstrated concern for the adversely affected parties. Nachman Corp. v. Pen-
sion Ben. Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 367-68 n.12 (1980).
W.B. Worthen, 292 U.S. at 434.
Nachman, 446 U.S. at 368 n.12.
U2 Allied, 438 U.S. at 248.
,43 The analysis of the parties' expectations is based upon the expectation of the lenders
that the loans would not be outstanding for their full term. See ECONOMIc ANALYSIS. supra
note 13, at 7.
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to refinance; lenders expected borrowers to pay off the mortgage before
the term expired.' Neither party anticipated the borrower becoming the
financier of future sales or the lender invoking the clause to force
refinancing.'45 The extra gain the borrower received from allowing assump-
tion, therefore, was an unforeseen windfall profit, whose elimination is
reasonable under the contract clause. 4' For mortgages entered into after
invalidation, the potential gain received from assumption is not a windfall
profit. To avoid losses caused by longer term mortgages, lenders may have
increased the interest rates of their mortgages."7 If the interest rates were
adjusted, the profit from future assumptions was paid by the borrower.
Removal of the restrictions on enforcement, therefore, gives the lender a
windfall and takes from the borrower a gain reasonably to be expected from
the contract.
In determining reasonable reliance, the second subtest of impact, analysis
of whether the removal of restraint was unexpected is less clear than
analysis of whether the removal was drastic. Whether preemption should
have been anticipated depends upon the Supreme Court's interpretation
of prior regulation. If the Court intends prior regulation to mean regula-
tion of a particular subject, preemption is unexpected. The federal govern-
ment has not regulated acceleration clauses. If prior regulation includes
regulation of an area, even though the particular subject has not been
regulated, preemption should have been expected. Although mortgages are
traditionally thought of as a matter of state property law subject to
equitable defenses,4 8 the federal government has taken an increasing role
by regulating lending practices and insuring loans.
Several federal laws have added requirements which must be fulfilled
by mortgage lenders."' The Truth-in-Lending Act"' requires lenders to
disclose interest and finance charges. The Fair Housing Act"' prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race or sex. The Real Estate Settlement Pro-
cedures Act"2 requires disclosures concerning settlement costs and ap-
proved closing statements, and prohibits certain types of kickbacks between
mortgage lenders and other providers of settlement services. The Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act"3 requires institutional lenders to assemble and
144 Id.
I Cassidy, supra note 7, at 35.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 114-18.
", See Cassidy, supra note 7; see Dietrich, supra note 25. But see Cassidy, supra note 7,
at 36 n.1.
1,8 See supra text accompanying notes 31-42.
14 Earthman, Residential Mortgage Lending: Charting a Course Through the Regulatory Maze,
29 VAND. L. Rav. 957, 969-80 (1976).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j (1982).
42 U.S.C. SS 3601-19, 3631 (1982).
12 U.S.C. SS 2601, 2602-04, 2607, 2609, 2616, 2617 (Supp. 1 1976).
12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-09 (1982).
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release to the public data on the amounts and locations of their residential
loans.
Notice of future regulation of mortgages by the federal government also
may be found in preemption of state debtor protection laws when the United
States, through one of its mortgage insurance programs, is a plaintiff as
the holder and forecloser of a mortgage."' Courts have found that debtor
protection laws which impose financial burdens on lenders are preempted
by federal law because they frustrate both "the federal policy to protect
the treasury and to promote the security of the federal investment"'' 5 and
the purpose of the federal programs which is "to facilitate the building of
homes by the use of federal credit."'56 Although the previous preemption
controversy which surrounded due-on-sale clauses was limited to federal
savings and loans,"n the preemption doctrine that emerged from cases in
which the United States was a plaintiff was not limited to federal savings
and loans and may be construed as notice to all borrowers that debtor pro-
tection laws, such as due-on-sale restrictions, could be superceded by the
needs of the federal government.
Plaintiffs with pre-regulation loans from federal savings and loans may
find the prior regulation obstacle impossible to hurdle. As the Court noted
in Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan v. de la Cuesta, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board was given the authority to regulate the thrift's lending
practices by HOLA, and has used this authority extensively ilicluding, in
particular, regulation of the terms of loan instruments." Because of this
long and extensive history of particular regulation, pre-regulation plain-
tiffs have little chance of showing that preemption was unexpected.
Whether the Court would view the impact of due-on-sale preemption as
severe depends not only upon prior regulation, but also upon whether the
regulation imposes a drastic new burden. In Allied Structural Steel v. Span-
naus the plaintiff relied on existing law to determine future liability in fund-
ing a pension plan."9 Passage of the state law, which retroactively imposed
" See Note, Federal Housing Loans: Is State Mortgage Law Preempted?, 19 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 431 (1979); see also Bartlett, The Federal-State Preemption Conflict, 44 LEGAL BULL. 1
(1978).
15 Note, supra note 154, at 439 (quoting U.S. v. View Crest Garden Apts. Inc., 268 F.2d
380, 383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959)).
'" Id. In United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), the Supreme Court appears to have
narrowed this preemption rule. Although the Court relied on the fact that the parties had
bargained for a state choice of law clause, the Court's principal rationale involved a weighing
of the respective interests of the state and federal governments. OSBORNE, NELSON & WHIT-
MAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw 698 (1979). While the federal government's interest in collect-
ing money more quickly may not be sufficient to override state debtor protection law, other
federal interests may be sufficient. Id. at 700-01.
157 See generally Sanders, "Due-on-Sale" Clauses: Are They Enforceable in Florida?, 54 FLA.
B.J. 679 (1980); Note, A Case for Preemption: Wellenkamp v. Bank of America is Inapplicable
to Federal Savings and Loan Associations, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219 (1980).
15 Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3029 n.20 (1982).
159 Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 240, 246 (1978).
[Vol. 58:651
DUE-ON-SALE RESTRICTIONS
a vesting requirement of pension benefits covering a ten year period, left
the plaintiff with potentially devastating contractual obligations." Although
plaintiffs affected by the preemption of due-on-sale restrictions have lost
an economically advantageous aspect of their contracts, 6' preemption does
not impose an additional obligation or have an economic impact as drastic
as that in Allied.
Analysis under the public purpose test is more straightforeward than
under the severity test. Extending the preemption of due-on-sale restric-
tions to other lenders serves a public purpose. Due-on-sale restrictions cause
buyers to pay an inflated price for an existing home with a lower rate
assumable loan."2 Also, the restrictions force lenders to charge a premium
for new loans to offset losses from old loans" and to cover risks incurred
by longer term loans."' Due-on-sale restrictions encourage default because
the purchase price of the home is inflated to reflect the preferential terms
that the parties attribute to the assumable loan, thus increasing the buyer's
nominal liabilities relative to the underlying market value.' When the
buyer must refinance, typically in five years, the underlying value may be
insufficient. 66 Due-on-sale restrictions also increase defaults by encourag-
ing transactions outside of the established market.6 ' Nonmarket transac-
tions are more likely to end in default because the parties are inexperi-
enced at valuing the property and are more likely to agree upon values
and financing costs that are out of line with the underlying risks borne by
them." Due-on-sale restrictions discourage the use of roll-over and variable
rate mortgages. 9 In addition, by extending preemption to all lenders, the
Act removes a competitive advantage from the federal savings and loans.7 '
The most important public purpose served by the Act is the relief it gives
to the savings and loan industry. The industry, whose primary function
is to finance the purchase of construction of housing,"" is crucial to the na-
tion's credit system. Restrictions on the use of due-on-sale clauses adver-
sely affect the thrifts in two ways. First, prohibiting the use of due-on-sale
clauses to update portfolios produces a slowdown in prepayment cash flows
which might reduce the ability of the thrifts to make new mortgage loans.'
" Id. at 247-48.
"' ECONoMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 5.
1e2 Id.
"1 Dietrich, supra note 25, at 25.Id. at 20.
l Id. at 25.
Id. at 27.
"7 Id. at 31.
1€$ Id.
"' ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. supra note 13, at 17.
'7o History, supra note 4, at 21, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS at 3075.
171 WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON BANKING LAW 41 (1976).
" Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 37 (1940).
1 Cassidy, supra note 7, at 25.
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Second, the invalidation erodes the market value of the thrift's mortgage
portfolios, potentially impairing their capital position.174 The economic
viability of the savings and loan industry clearly is aided by removing
restraints on due-on-sale enforcement.
The last step of the contract clause analysis, the reasonable and necessary
test, is a least intrusive means analysis which requires the legislature to
demonstrate that it attempted to impose liability only to the extent
necessary to achieve the public purpose."5 Limited intrusiveness is found
in "limitations as to time, amount, circumstances [and] need."'76 Legislation
impairing private contracts enjoys a presumption favoring the legislative
judgment of the reasonableness and necessity of the measure. 7 Congress
attempted to moderate the impact of due-on-sale enforcement on
homeowners in non-enforcement jurisdictions in several ways: by providing
a three year grace period before their rights were preempted,'78 by plac-
ing restrictions on the type of transfers that could trigger invocation of
the due-on-sale clause, 79 by encouraging lenders to accept assumption at
the old interest rate or at a rate below the current market rate,180 and by
prohibiting the retroactive enforcement of due-on-sale clauses for property
sales that took place before the legislation was enacted.' Although this
facial concern for the impact of the legislation on adversely affected par-
ties supports the presumption in favor of validity to stand, it is instructive
to consider weaknesses in the offered protection.
The relief provided by the three year grace period may be illusory.
Although the mortgages would continue to be regulated by state law dur-
ing that period, the states and other regulatory bodies are authorized to
change the law by repealing existing due-on-sale restrictions, by lengthen-
ing the grace period, or by authorizing below market rates for assumptions
of these loans. 2 Because the states and regulatory agencies are free to
act, the homeowner cannot rely on the continued existence of rights dur-
ing the grace period.
Unlike the grace period contemplated by the Supreme Court in Allied,
during which the insurer could adjust for the obligation by changing its
funding practices, there is little the homeowner can do during the grace
period to minimize the impact of the due-on-sale legislation on his interests.
The homeowner, knowing that in three years he will not be able to sell
his home for an inflated price, has two options: to sell now or to increase
17 Id. The loss on the book value of California savings and loans in 1978 due to the invalida-
tion of the clauses has been estimated to have been the equivalent of 45% of their net worth. Id.
'5 See supra text accompanying notes 13842.
W.B. Worthen v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 434 (1934).
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697, 706 (1983).
178 12 U.S.C. S 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982).
179 Id. S 1701j-3(d).
History, supra note 4, at 21, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3075.




savings so that he will have available at the time he enters the housing
market the funds he might have obtained by selling his below market in-
terest rate.
Encouragement of below market interest rates provides little protection
to homeowners. Below market rates benefit all parties to the transaction
by allowing lenders to increase interest income on older loans, by facilitating
sale, and by providing affordable rates to buyers. Encouraging below
market rates, however, is illusory protection because it is nonmandatory.
The limitations on enforcement were not particularly designed to
moderate the impact of the Act on homeowners in nonenforcement jurisdic-
tions. Drawn from a Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulation," the limita-
tions are a general consumer protection measure and are not an attempt
to ameliorate the impact of due-on-sale preemption on the nonenforcement
class. Also, the prohibition on retroactive enforcement may have been
motivated more by a desire to avoid other serious constitutional problems
than by a desire to lessen impact on homeowners. If retroactive enforce-
ment had been allowed, affected homeowners easily could have shown that
the expectation of validity was of central concern at the time of sale and
that invalidation of the transaction would place on the parties drastic, new
obligations equivalent to those in Allied. If the purpose of prohibiting
retroactivity was to avoid a separate constitutional problem, it may not
be used as evidence of amelioration.
In sum, examination of the extension of preemption using the tests of
the revived contract clause shows that a serious constitutional challenge
may be raised only by plaintiffs who entered into their contracts after the
use of due-on-sale clauses was restricted. The success of the challenge
depends upon how the Court interprets prior regulation and weighs the
severity of the impact against the clear public purpose and facially valid,
though weak, least intrusive means. Because the extension serves impor-
tant public goals, the borrower's interests are clearly outweighed.
JUST COMPENSATION
Although the fifth amendment's prohibition against taking property
without just compensation is expressed in absolute terms,"' government
could not function if it was forced to pay for every decrease in property
value caused by its regulations.' Just compensation analysis concerns the
tension in allowing government freedom to respond to change without
rendering the just compensation clause meaningless.186
12 C.F.R. 5 545.8-3(g) (1983).
In "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
' Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
18 Note, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due Process
or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REV. 315,321 (1979).
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The central principle behind the just compensation clause is that
"[g]overnment [should not] forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'"
As a limit on the government power to isolate particular individuals for
sacrifice to the public good, just compensation analysis contains a
distributive choice similar to that of torts law: the choice between "(1)leaving
the harm where the government action initially imposed it, and (2)taking
steps to spread the harm more widely or at least differently."', If a court
determines that fairness requires that the costs should not be borne by
the individual alone, the law will be invalidated for failure to pay just
compensation.
Courts and commentators have been unable to articulate a single, sim-
ple test to determine when a government regulation results in a taking. 89
The Supreme Court's analysis of whether compensation is required is essen-
tially an ad hoc factual inquiry.9 If the regulation passes the threshold re-
quirement of substantially advancing a legitimate state interest, 9' the Court
has considered the character of the government action, its economic impact,
and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations." The
legitimate state interest factor is similar to the public purpose test of the
contract clause because both analyses invalidate laws that fail to advance
a legitimate public goal." Character of government action refers to physical
invasion by the government.9 Because the extension of due-on-sale preemp-
tion serves a public purpose and does not involve a physical invasion by
the government, the just compensation analysis centers on economic im-
pact and interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.
If the Court considers economic impact as distinct from interference with
investment-backed expectations, 95 this test is analytically troublesome. In
' Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (quoting Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
1" TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 464 (1978); accord MichelmanProperty, Utility and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv.L. REV.
1165, 1169 (1967).
1" Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
190 Id.
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980).
1 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980).
193 See supra text accompanying notes 134-37. The legitimate state interest test is derived
from Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). In Nectow, a local zoning ordinance deprived
a landowner of all practical uses of his land. The Supreme Court invalidated the regulation
not only because it prevented an adequate return on the investment for the development
of the property, but also because it failed to promote the health, safety, convenience, or public
welfare of the public. 277 U.S. at 187-88.
19 Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at 125; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatten CATV Corp., 102
S. Ct. 3164, 3175 (1982).
19 Although the Penn. Central opinion appeared to consider the two factors together
("economic impact of the regulation ... and particularly, the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations... 438 U.S. at 124) subse-
quent opinions appear to list them as separate factors. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 84.
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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon," Justice Holmes promulgated the theory
that, while economic values may be diminished somewhat without compen-
sation, they may not be diminished excessively. 197 The test is difficult to
apply because it calls for an arbitrary pinpointing of a critical amount of
loss. "'98 Furthermore, the Court has begun to recharacterize Pennsylvania
Coal.' Rather than cite the case as an example of commercial impracticabil-
ity with "nearly the same effect as the complete destruction"' of the leased
property rights, the Court now describes the case as a "loss of a profit op-
portunity ... accompanied by a physical restriction against the removal
of the coal." ' ' Similarly, loss of the most profitable use has been found not
to be a taking when unaccompanied by physical invasion.0 2 The Court,
therefore, while influenced by economic impact, does not recognize a tak-
ing based on economic impact alone."3
More analytically useful is the reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tion test."4 Based on a property expectation concept, this test requires com-
pensation if the government interferes with a sufficiently important or fun-
damental expectancy reasonably held by private parties."5 The
reasonableness of the expectation depends upon whether the holder had
prior warning that his expectation was inconsistent with the expectation
of another party."' Compensation is not required if society adequately has
made it known that the activity should not become a source for expecta-
tions of continuing enjoyment.' For example, if an investor buys scenic
land during the height of public discussion about restricting its use, he
should not be paid the difference between the land's value without restric-
tions and the value of the land with the restrictions should they be adopted.
The price of the land should have been discounted by the possibility that
the restrictions would be imposed. The investor, therefore, has received
what he paid for, and compensation is not due." The reasonableness aspect
of the investment-backed expectations test, therefore, denies compensa-
tion for investments that society has designated should not be the object
of expectations of continuing enjoyment."9 The test, therefore, is similar
1- 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
191 Id.
1 Michelman, supra note 188, at 1233.
19 Va. Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 439 (W.D. Va.
1980).
2 Id. (quoting Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at 127).
221 Id. (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 n.22 (1979)).
Allard, 444 U.S. at 66.
m See id.
0 Michelman, supra note 188, argues that the Court actually has been applying the
reasonable investment-backed expectation test when analyzing diminution in value.
21 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
' Michelman, supra note 188, at 1235-45.
2n Id. at 1241.




to the reasonable reliance test of the contract clause."' If the party is on
notice that his property interest is subject to regulation, an investment
based on an expectation of no change is unreasonable.
Not all reasonable expectations are entitled to compensation if destroyed
by government regulations. In deciding whether a particular governmen-
tal action has effected a taking, the Supreme Court has focused on the
nature and extent of interference with rights in the property as a whole."'
If the property owner owns nothing of consequence after the regulation,
the regulation interfered with a reasonable investment-backed
expectation."' When the regulation does not involve physical occupation
or invasion,21 destruction of one use is not a taking so long as the owner
is left with other uses.14
Just Compensation and Due-on-Sale
A taking analysis begins with the indentification of the impaired prop-
erty interest. Property "denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the
citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and
dispose of it."2 5 Enforcement of due-on-sale restricts the owner's ability
to sell and decreases future profits. 6 The loss of this property interest
receives a two-step analysis under the takings clause: whether the expec-
tation was reasonable, and whether it was an investment-backed expecta-
tion. However, as a preliminary matter, the three year grace period1 of
the due-on-sale preemption must be distinguished from a statute of limita-
tion. If the grace period were a permissible statute of limitation, the tak-
ings issue would not arise.
The legitimating characteristic of a statute of limitation is the opportunity
afforded the party to establish his rights in court.218 Absent this opportunity,
a statute bars existing rights arbitrarily. 9 An example of a grace period
that is an acceptable statute of limitations may be found in Texaco v. Short."
An Indiana statute provided that a mineral lease not used for twenty years
would expire unless the owner filed a proper claim with the county recorder.
The statute also included, however, a two year grace period during which
the owner could act before the expiration of the lease became effective.
210 See supra text accompanying notes at 120-36.
Ill Allard, 444 U.S. at 66-67.
212 Michelman, supra note 188, at 1234; Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at 128-29.
213 The distinction between occupations and invasions was emphasized in Loretto, 102 S.
Ct. at 3171-77.
214 See Allard, 444 U.S. at 67.
215 Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at 142-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
218 See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
217 12 U.S.C. S 1701j-3(c)(1) (1982).
18 Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1902).
219 Id.
= 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
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The Supreme Court held that the grace period was permissible because
the state had the power to condition the retention of the property right
upon the performance of an act within a limited period of time. '
Unlike the Indiana statute, preemption of due-on-sale does not allow the
owner to retain his property interest by the performance of an act, such
as recording; the right unconditionally disappears at the end of the grace
period. The three year grace period, which bars existing rights arbitrar-
ily, merely postpones the taking. The taking issue, therefore, must be
addressed.
The analysis of whether an expectation of continuing enjoyment of due-
on-sale restrictions was reasonable involves the same problems inherent
in analyzing reasonable reliance under the contract clause.' It is unclear
whether the mortgagor should have anticipated preemption. If the Court
would restrict notice to the particular area of acceleration clauses, it is
reasonable for a mortgagor from the other lender declared group to rely
on state guaranteed rights to sell without invoking the clause.' If the Court
were to find notice in the regulation of lenders and the preemption con-
troversy surrounding the United States as plaintiff cases, such reliance
would not be reasonable. 4
Even if the Court finds that reliance was reasonable, interference with
the expectation is not compensable. While the enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses causes a loss of future profits, the significance of this loss must be
considered in light of the owner's retention of all other rights.
Loss of future profits as the only interest taken did not support a taking
in Andrus v. Allard. 5 Dealers in Indian artifacts containing eagle feathers
challenged regulations promulgated under the Eagle Protection Acts and
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which forbid sale of the relics but did allow
their possession or transportation."' The dealers argued that the prohibi-
tion deprived them of the opportunity to earn a profit from their relics and
was an uncompensated taking.' The Court agreed that the regulations
deprived the plaintiffs of the most profitable use of their property but
stressed that they were still able to derive an economic benefit. 8 Loss of
future profits, unaccompanied by any physical property restriction, could
not support a taking because "[p]rediction of profitability is essentially a
matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent
to perform. Further, perhaps because of its very uncertainty, the interest
221 Id. at 791.
See supra text accompanying notes at 147-58.
2MId.
2U Id.
444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979).




INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than
other property-related interests."'
Preemption of due-on-sale restrictions causes less severe interference
with expectations than the regulations in Allard; there is no absolute pro-
hibition of sale and the most profitable use is not denied. Preemption,
therefore, is not compensable under the takings clause.
CONCLUSION
Although borrowers may have reasonably relied on the continued ex-
istence of state restrictions on due-on-sale enforcement, their expectations
are not protected by the due process and takings clauses. The important
public purposes accomplished by the extension clearly outweigh the bor-
rowers' expectations of future profits.
SUSAN LACAVA
Id. The test is, of course, somewhat disingenuous since future profits in many instances
are the sole determinant of present value. The test may have been prompted by the Court's
desire to preserve the effectiveness of the Acts. The plaintiffs had shown that the feathers
in their relics were obtained before passage of the Acts. The Court may have feared that,
if pre-Act feathers were exempted from the Acts, the prohibitions of the Acts too easily could
have been avoided by claiming that the seized feathers were obtained before passage.
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